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a b s t r a c t
Modern clinical case reporting takes the form of problem-solution narratives that redescribe symptoms
in terms of disease categories. Authored almost always by those who have played a part in the medical
assessment of the patient, reports historicise the salient details of an individual’s illness as a complex
effect of identiﬁable antecedent causes. Candidate hypotheses linking illness to pathological mechanisms
are suggested by the patient’s experience, and by data that emerge from clinical examination and
investigation. Observational and interpretive statements from these considerations are ﬁtted into a
temporally inﬂected account of the patient’s medical condition, conﬁgured from the vantage point of
hindsight. Drawing on established forms of deferred telling, readers are invited to follow a story that
drip-feeds a mixture of contingent and non-incidental information into the account, which engenders
and frustrates curiosity, creates expectations, and challenges powers of reasoning and pattern recogni-
tion. Whereas case reporting once favoured memoir, the sentimental tale and eccentric biography as the
means by which its historical narrative was cast, the preferred genres of contemporary case reporting
include detective ﬁction, and puzzle and riddle narratives, formats that conceptualise the medical
consultation in narrow problem-solution terms.
Crown Copyright  2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction: not if p but which p?
Modern clinical case reports are problem-solution accounts of
how an individual’s felt experiences of illness have come to be
understood in terms of disease categories. Authored almost
invariably by those who have played some part in the medical
assessment of the patient, published case reports are crafted
statements of witness marked by scene-setting strategies and
graphic descriptions of clinical ﬁndings. What John Forrester
verbalized as ‘thinking in cases,’1 contemporary clinical case re-
ports recount through controlled disclosures of observations and
reasoning, positioned with the beneﬁt of hindsight in a narrative.
Forrester’s paper “If p, then what?” is credited with refocusing
interest on case construals as pathways to understanding the
methods and reasonings of case-based disciplines.2 Whilst his
paper focused largelyon the ‘thenwhat’ that follows frompewhere
p for the most part is unproblematically known - clinical cases
devote greater attention to observations and the possible multi-
plicity of p; to what deserves to be noticed in view of the need to
differentiate p1-pn, and so to fathomwhich p ﬁts the case in hand.
The Lancet recently announced it had increased the space
devoted to publishing case reports, particularly those elucidating
‘an unusual presentation of a common disease or a rare cause of a
common presentation if not something completely novel.’3 The
editors contended that ‘stories form the basis of how we learn, and
how we remember’ and that case reporting practices embody
clinical experiences that collectively constitute a written repository
comparable to other literary and cultural genres:
‘Throughout history people have interpreted the world around
them and passed on lessons learned through myths, fairy tales,
parables, and anecdotes. Medicine is no different . The ideal
Case Report will have an unexpected twist or detective element,
is engagingly written, and has a learning point for a general
medical audience.’4
E-mail address: brian.hurwitz@kcl.ac.uk.
1 Forrester, John, ‘If p, then what? Thinking in cases’, History of the Human Sciences
1996; 9(3) 1e25. See also his recently collected papers on cases: Forrester, John,
Thinking in Cases, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2017.
2 In their written form such pathways include not only the case history according
to Gianna Pomata, but also the aphorism, dialogue, essay and medical recipe, all of
which she counts as an ‘epistemic genre’ in medicine. See Pomata, Gianna, ‘The
Medical Case Narrative: Distant reading of an Epistemic Genre.’ Literature and
Medicine, 2014; 32(1): pp. 1-23. See also: Morgan, Mary S, ‘Case Studies: One
Observation or Many? Justiﬁcation or Discovery?’ Philosophy of Science 2012; 79(5):
667-77.
3 Berman P, Horton R, ‘Case Reports in The Lancet e a new narrative.’ Lancet, 2015;
385: 1277.
4 Berman, P, Horton R, ‘Case Reports’ Lancet, 2015.
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Twenty years earlier the journal had established a new section on
case reporting to enable clinicians to ‘relay the sort of clinical anec-
dote they might tell colleagues during a morning coffee break’ in
despatches from the clinical frontline conveying ‘a striking message:
a description of a new treatment, adverse effect of medication, evi-
dence that might suggest a newmechanism for a disease process, or
a new intervention.’5 That initiative marked the point when the post
WWII decline in medical publication of single cases was coming to
an end. Despite their uncontrolled, non-experimental nature, likeli-
hood of observer bias and inherent inability to estimate the preva-
lence or incidence of clinical features of interest, by the end of the
twentieth century case reports were increasingly recognized as
playing important if not unique evidential roles in medical practice.
These roles included bringing to light very rare clinical phenomena,
delineating initial descriptions of previously unrecognised diseases
such as HIV, Ebola and Lyme disease,6 demonstrating the concur-
rence of clinical symptoms and signs constellated as syndromes,7
and in identifying and deﬁning adverse drug reactions.8 The
importance of these roles re-instilled interest in clinical cases and led
to what has been called a ‘renaissance of the case report literature’.9
This paper will draw out the narrative scaffoldings of contemporary
medical case reports, their interplay with other storied genres, and
how clinical ﬁndings and their explanations become enmeshed in
the literary machinery of reporting.
Forrester acknowledged a pedagogic aspect to cases that ‘dupli-
cates or repeats an essential element of medical practice’,10 in a form
of writing ‘epistemically . nailed down to the level of the individ-
ual’.11 But although the case report ‘brings back’12 elements of the
clinical encounter arising from and pertaining to a particular indi-
vidual, its ostensive focus is on the medical condition, syndrome, or
treatment and its effects, not the personwho is ill. However, tension
between these potential foci of case reporting practices will become
apparent. Consider a clinical vignette that appeared in the British
Medical Journal in 2007 in a paper entitled “When are randomised
trials unnecessary?” to exhibit the authors’ claim that ‘the relation
between a treatment and its effect is sometimes so dramatic that
bias can be ruled out as an explanation’:
‘A child presented to a clinic with a plastic bead lodged high in
one nostril. The general practitioner asked the nurse for forceps,
but she asked him whether he had thought of trying the
mother’s kiss technique. This entailed occluding the unblocked
nostril while the mother blew into the child’s mouth. The bead
was easily dislodged and retrieved in this way, and mother and
child were both delighted.’13
In sketching a manoeuvre to relieve this relatively common
childhood condition the authors convey something of the atmo-
sphere of the clinic, its voices, emotions and sounds e dialogue and
‘delight’ e which serves to convince readers that the account is
grounded in the realities of daily clinical work. The vignette signals
clinical verisimilitude and an immediate therapeutic effect, an
instance of a generalization applicable beyond the singularities of
this particular child.
Elements of the scenario are plainly incidental to the causal
claim of interest, such as the conversation between doctor and
nurse (a nurse who appears to be better informed than the doc-
tor), which steers treatment away from a more traumatic extrac-
tion with forceps, to a focus on mother and child and on a
cooperative procedure. Such details can be read as valorising
clinical teamwork and the doctor’s willingness to try a treatment
he or she has not previously thought of. But these aspects of the
account also point to a degree of contingency in the situation e
what would have happened had a different nurse been on duty or
no nurse at all? e and raise the possibility that a procedure that
could have been instituted was not, a counterfactual which en-
dows the scene with social and human signiﬁcance, whilst
dramatizing the cause and effect sequence on display (see Beatty
this issue).14
Viewed in isolation, the vignette recounts an observationwith a
persuasive power untempered by considerations such as: snugness
of ﬁt between the bead and nasal lining; how long it has been in the
child’s nose; whether prior attempts at retrieval have pushed the
bead upwards; whether there is a purulent nasal discharge (a sign
of mucosal ulceration and secondary infection); and the sort of
blowing required to dislodge the bead, be it sharp bursts or the
creation of a continuously rising pressurewave.15 In paying no heed
to these factors - to which particular p this child’s situation belongs
- which has implications for the relevant treatment16 - the vignette
outlines an almost paradigmatic instance of the manoeuvre’s
5 Bignall J, Horton R, ‘Learning from storiesdThe Lancet’s Case Reports.’ Lancet
1995; 346: 1246. Although the language of case reports tends to efface their origins
in human and healthcare relationships, the authors of a study of evidence in
practice point to the importance of informal relations and communications in the
development of clinical understanding: ‘Coffee-room chat may impact on evidence-
based practice at least as much as all those guidelines that deluge GPs. [and].we
need to understand how and why that is.’. Gabbay, John, Andreé le May. ‘Mind-
lines: making sense of evidence in practice’, BJGP 2016; 66:402-3 at 402.
6 See Vandenbroucke, Jan P, ‘In Defense of Case Reports and Case Series.’ Ann Intern
Med. 2001; 134:330e334. See also: Carey, John C, ‘Signiﬁcance of Case Reports in
the Advancement of Medical Scientiﬁc Knowledge’, American Journal of Medical
Genetics Part A 2006; 140A:2131e2134; van der Wall, E.E., ‘Case history: more than
a beauty case!’ Netherlands Heart Journal 2008; 16 (7/8): 235e6.
7 By syndrome is meant a repeatedly observed conﬁguration of clinical features
believed to reﬂect a pathological mechanism or class of phenomena not fully
explained, such as autism, anorexia-bulimia, or post-traumatic stress disorder. See:
Aronowitz, Robert A, ‘When Do Symptoms Become a Disease?’ Ann Intern Med
2001;134:803e808. See Morgan’s discussion of colligation in this issue.
8 Aronson, Jeffrey K, Manfred Hauben, ‘Anecdotes that provide deﬁnitive evidence’,
BMJ 2006;333:1267e1269.
9 Smalheiser, Neil R, Weixiang Shao, Philip S. Yu, ‘Nuggets: ﬁndings shared in
multiple clinical case reports.’ J Med Lib Assoc 2015; 103(4): 171e6 at 171. The
revaluation of case reports has taken place both in general medical journals and in
journals founded solely to publish cases. See: Akers, Katherine, ‘New journals for
publishing medical case reports’, J Med Libr Assoc 2016; 104(2): 146e9; van der
Wall, E.E., ‘Case history: more than a beauty case!’ Netherlands Heart Journal 2008;
16 (7/8): 235e6.
10 Forrester 1996 p 14.
11 Forrester, John, ‘On Kuhn’s Case: Psychoanalysis and the Paradigm.’ Critical In-
quiry 2007; 23: 782e819 at p 810.
12 DeBakey, Lois, Selma Debakey, ‘The case report. I. Guidelines for preparation’,
International Journal of Cardiology 1983;4:357e64, p 358.
13 Glasziou, Paul, Iain Chalmers, Michael Rawlins, Peter McCulloch, ‘When are
randomised trials unnecessary? Picking signal from noise.’ BMJ 2007;334; 349e351
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.39070.527986.68.
14 Prince,Gerald, Narratology: The Form and Function of Narrative, Berlin: Mouton,
1982; pp. 4, 145; Prince, Gerald, A Dictionary of Narratology, Lincoln and London:
University of Nebraska Press, 1987; p. 59.
15 The factors mentioned as possibly bearing on the outcome of this procedure,
have pertained to the nature, geometrical and material properties of the misplaced
objects in the nose e tissue paper, snippets of cloth, plasticine, small toys, food
items, polystyrene foam, magnets, pen parts, crayon pieces and living creatures
such as lavae and worms e omit reference to possible child-centred factors such as
gender, age, personality, mental health, or to the relationship with the parent and
parental competence in performing the manoeuvre.
16 Fischer, Jonathan, ‘Nasal Foreign Bodies.’ Medscape August 2015, http://
emedicine.medscape.com/article/763767-overview?pa¼G%2FU0EkyrUiTnPaNEsu
FEgu99QFCcoSRbI4SjH0mts2H4oLW3vAjCIjVOB5LkABisLCEJNCrbkqLWYvqLrhnt
WA%3D%3D#a7 [retrieved 15 Nov 2016].
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efﬁcacy,17 its persuasiveness bolstered by the ebullient mood and
celebratory tone of the narrative’s affecting denouement.
However, some of the details of the emplotment here may not
be as incidental to the efﬁcacy of the procedure as theymay appear,
such as the plastic nature of the misplaced bead - if this implies it
was round and smooth that may account for the ‘easy’ removal -
and the fact that success transpired on the ﬁrst attempt. The sig-
niﬁcance of such details are suggested by other case reports which
consider factors on which success may hinge such as the nature,
size, shape and regularity of the object in the nasal cavity and how
many ‘kisses’ are worth attempting.18 Success may also depend on
the way a young child is approached to win their cooperation, as
not all blowers are likely to gain the cooperative involvement that is
required.19 Which descriptive details are incidental and which are
material to the efﬁcacy of the manoeuvre reﬂects the heterogeneity
of misplaced objects in the nasal cavity, the age and cooperative-
ness of children with this problem: the diversity in p.
Although the actors in this situation are anonymous and char-
acterized in only the sketchiest of terms, the vignette invokes
‘particular individuals living particular lives and having particular
experiences’20 as well as a determination to understand their sit-
uation ‘from the perspective of the general’.21 Steve Sturdy argues
that in relation to ‘knowledge of cases the content or meaning of
any scientiﬁc generalization is no more than the ﬁnite set of cases
that are taken to be instances or exempliﬁcations of that general-
ization.’22 The sparsity of the vignette’s details appears to exemplify
a generalization of wide scope unqualiﬁed by the differing cir-
cumstances of children with a misplaced foreign body in their
nostrils.
Despite its brevity the vignette ties together four individuals in a
pairwise cooperative venture that shifts attention away from the
ostensive medical focus on a cause and effect relationship of clear
therapeutic beneﬁt to the human relationships involved in the
clinical scenario. It thereby illustrates George Rousseau’s claim that
‘every time a patient enters a practitioner’s ofﬁce a literary expe-
rience is about to occur: replete with characters, setting, time,
place, language and a scenario that can end in a number of pre-
dictable ways.’23
2. The narrative: detective novels and the gothic case
In setting out how illness or injury can be translated into a
diagnosis, case reporting attempts to match selected elements of
illness experience and clinical ﬁndings with plausible medical
causes and mechanisms. Confronted with ‘the patient’s messy
humanity’,24 Jason Tougaw argues that the narrator picks out and
orders elements abstracted from the history and examination of the
patient (see Morgan this issue), in an ‘attempt to make signs and
things match’, contemporary reporting practices favoring certain
recognisable genres. One narrative template has gained particular
prominence notes Kathryn Hunter:
‘Like a Sherlock Holmes story, the case presentation is . con-
cerned with the way knowledge is acquired as well as with the
nature of the “facts”. Like the criminal. the disease in the case
presentation is discovered in a double sense: it is determined by
the investigating physician and revealed by the same person,
now become the narrator. discovery proceeds from the careful
arrangement of data which the physician. has gathered from
the words and the body presented for scrutiny.’25
Detective and clinical casework share imaginative, interrogative
and inferential moves inﬂected in appeals to puzzle out and ﬁt
together diverse pieces of information in ‘a single connected
narrative’.26 In both ﬁelds of activity accounts of cases defer telling
by withholding information and concealing elements as in a ‘game
of suspense and mystery’.27 The emergence of pattern is orches-
trated through a process that stages access to ﬁndings by drip-
feeding descriptive information in which reasoning and the for-
mation of hypotheses are the intermediary links of narrative be-
ginnings and endings (see Rosales’s discussion in this issue). Lucy
Sussex ﬁnds the puzzle-making and unriddling activities of
nineteenth-century detective ﬁction28 to have been informed by a
gothic aesthetic derived from suspenseful and sensational plots.
David Punter picks up on this in his study of Gothic Pathologies:
‘The case is the compound of rule and singularity. Whenwe talk
of ‘case law’ we talk of the importance of the individual case.
the exceptionwhich proves the rule, or.the rule which brooks
no exception.. The case is also the suitcase, the briefcase, the
container. What Gothic shows is that this case always falls
open (and, as it were, things fall out).’29
17 It is not clear whether this account, written by a group of physician-scientists
(one of whom several years later published a systematic review of case series
featuring this manoeuvre) arises from personal witness; the fact that it is written in
the third person suggests it may be a composite of several cases of this complaint
and its treatment, an illustration of a typical example of it.
18 Pooled outcomes in one systematic review have not found these factors to
predict success. See: Cook, Stephanie, Burton, Martin, Glasiou, Paul, ‘Efﬁcacy and
safety of the “mother’s kiss” technique: a systematic review of case reports and case
series.’ Can Med Assoc Journal 2012; 184(17): E904eE912. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.
1503/cmaj.111864.
19 The importance of child cooperation is signiﬁed in the name that has come to be
associated with the procedure. See Guazzo, Eugene, ‘Removal of Foreign Bodies
from the Nose.’ NEJM 1985;312:725, Botma, Marissa, Bader, Rixana, Kuba, Haytham,
‘A parent’s kiss: evaluating an unusual method of removing nasal foreign bodies in
children.’ J Laryngol & Otology 2000;114: 598e600. In the Cook et al study some of
the case series list a care giver rather than a parent as the blower; success rates
between series vary from 100% to 49%, and rates between smooth and irregular
nasal objects are not distinguishable but numbers are small, the number of cases in
series ranging from 100 to 2. See: Cook, Stephanie, Burton, Martin, Glasiou, Paul,
‘Efﬁcacy and safety of the “mother’s kiss” technique’ 2012.
20 Norman, Richard, On Humanism, Routledge 2004; 152e3. Norman argues that
some narratives gain their power from conﬁguring a particular set of events readers
recognise as a ‘paradigmatic particularity’. p 153.
21 Turner, Henry S, ‘Lessons from Literature for the Historian of Science (and Vice
Versa).’ Isis 2010; 101: 578e589 at 585.
22 Sturdy, Steve, ‘Knowing Cases: Biomedicine in Edinburgh, 1887e1920’, Social
Studies of Science 2007; 37: 659e689 at p 676.
23 See Rousseau, George, ‘Discourses of Literature and Medicine: Theory and
Practice (1).’ In Enlightenment Borders, 2e25. Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1991 at p 10. See also Clark, William. ‘Narratology and the History of Science.’
Stud Hist Phil Sci 1995 vol 26.1, 1e71 at 56.
24 Tougaw, Jason Daniel, Strange Cases e The Medical Case History and the British
Novel. NY & London: Routledge 2006; p 49.
25 Hunter, Kathryn Montgomery, Doctors’ Stories: The Narrative Structure of Medical
Knowledge, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991; p 66.
26 Herzog, Todd, ‘Crime Stories: Criminal, Society, and the Modernist Case History’.
Representations 2002; 80: 34e61 at p 34 quoting from Doyle, Arthur Conan, The
Hound of the Baskervilles, in The Illustrated Sherlock Holmes Treasury. New York 1976;
527e632 at p 616. See also Schum, David A, Thoughts About a Science of Evidence.
London: University College London 2005; pp 1-70. https://www.ucl.ac.uk/jdi/
research/evidence-network/docs/Science.doc accessed 20/02/2017.
27 Sussex, Lucy, Women Writers and Detectives in Nineteenth-Century Crime Fiction:
The Mothers of the Mystery Genre. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2010; pp. 10,
18e24.
28 Rick Rylance notes that some clinical features of nineteenth-century cases are
treated in the pages of medical journals as ‘bizarre. grotesque . freakish’ and
‘gothic’. Rylance, Rick,‘The Theatre and the Granary: Observations on Nineteenth-
Century Medical Narratives’, Literature and Medicine 2006; 25: 255e276 p 269.
29 Punter, David, Gothic Pathologies: The Text, the Body and the Law. London: Pal-
grave Macmillan 1998; p 6.
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Drawing on the semantic burden case inherits from the Old
French word casse, meaning box or frame, shell or carcass, Punter
stresses the importance of suspense and surprise in the construc-
tion of ﬁctional cases, and hints at how access to secrets and
narrative mystery engenders not only curiosity but guessing and
conjecturing too. For Carole Levine these devices play an episte-
mological role: ‘as we read suspenseful plots we learn to doubt and
to guess, to speculate and hypothesise, to pause in the knowledge of
what we do not know’.30 Suspenseful plots provide a training
ground for learning to re-consider what within an account has gone
before, before jumping to conclusions. ‘Suspense demands a .
quite speciﬁc experience of the unknown’, she says, an awareness
of ignorance:
‘Evenwhen the solution to the mystery ultimately substantiates
our hopes and predictions, for there to have been suspense - for
us to have remained absorbed, apprehensive, doubtful . we
must have been willing to entertain a range of credible
resolutions.’31
The following case, which appeared in the British Medical Journal
in 1995, drives home its lesson by ostentatiously playing with un-
certainty and anticipation:
‘A builder aged 29 came to the accident and emergency
department having jumped down on to a 15 cm nail. As the
smallest movement of the nail was painful he was sedated with
fentanyl and midazolam. The nail was then pulled out from
below. When his boot was removed a miraculous cure appeared
to have taken place. Despite entering proximal to the steel
toecap the nail had penetrated between the toes: the foot was
entirely uninjured.’32
The account unfolds along an apparently straightforward
timeline, recounting an injury causing pain severe enough to
require a potent opioid analgesic before nail extraction is attemp-
ted. However, when readers textually and visually primed for an
impalement injury are advised to expect a ‘cure,’ the narrative ﬂirts
with expectation and assumes the characteristics of a riddle. The
clinician-authors play a mimetic trick on readers who are prepared
for a nasty wound but instead experience the same sort of surprise
the authors must have felt on removing the man’s boot (see Fig. 1).
The promise of a ‘miraculous cure’ turns out to be a false trail
laid to inﬂict momentary astonishment and bewilderment on
readers. The report duplicates something of the consternation felt
in the Emergency department and reveals that the urge to conjure
up the enigmatic - to entertain and shock with spectacle in what
Rick Rylance refers to as ‘shifts between gothic make-believe and
the modernized medical mode’33e is still at work in case reporting
today.
But the nail’s innocent anatomical position raises an additional
important question omitted from consideration: why did the man
feel so much pain? The report also leaves readers to ponder how
the workman reacted when he realized he was unharmed: was he
relieved, did he laugh at the joke his body had played on him and
on his medical attendants; or was he mystiﬁed by this turn of
events? Other contextual questions are left dangling such as: what
sort of a person the uninjured man was; was he an anxious,
frightened, unconﬁdent individual; did he have a phobia of hos-
pitals; had he previously suffered serious painful accidents; is he
the sort of person who ‘acts out’ when feeling threatened?34
Questions such as these show how unsatisfying case closure can
be, and how much relevant information about the person from
whom the case arises may be excluded from a case report; ques-
tions that challenge the separation of person (with a psychology)
from the medical condition under scrutiny, which conventions of
case reporting impose. The distinction between the person who is
ill (the patient), and the abstract category from which they suffer
(the disease or medical condition), appears porous if not unstable.35
3. Taking the patient’s history; telling the doctor’s story
Julia Epstein argues that ‘Western medical discourse postulates
that illness can be, at least momentarily (long enough. to study,
classify, and pass judgment on it), dissociable from the ill person.’36
In case reporting, as we have seen, this dissociation shows signs of
instability. Consider a case reported in the British Medical Journal in
2010 under the running title of “Endgames”:
‘A 25 year old woman presented to our institution with
increasing difﬁculty in swallowing, talking, and walking, which
resulted in her being virtually mute, wheelchair bound, and
perpetually drooling. She had presented to another institution
two and a half years beforewithworsening episodes of headache
and cramp in both feet. This had progressed to a generalised
weakness of her entire body, in addition to impaired speech and
problemswithmotor coordination. Clinical examination showed
cog wheel rigidity and a generalised jerky dystonic tremor, with
occasional hemiballismicmovement of the arms. brisk reﬂexes
and severe spasticity of the lower limbs. Her speech was slurred
and bilateral corneal discoloration was noted.’37
Fig. 1. Reproduced from the British Medical Journal, Fisher JP, Hassan DT, O’Connor N.,
Vol 310 page 70, (copyright notice 4003140950535 2016) with permission from BMJ
Publishing Group Ltd.
30 Levine, Carole, The Serious Pleasures of Suspense: Victorian Realism and Narrative
Doubt. Virginia: University of Virginia Press 2003; p 3.
31 Levine, Serious Pleasures p 74.
32 Fisher JP, Hassan DT, O’Connor N, BMJ 1995; 310:70. (Unusually this case image
is untitled).
33 Rylance ‘The Theatre and the Granary’ p 270.
34 Some of these questions arose in discussions of an earlier draft of this paper
with Michael Flexer.
35 Robert Aronowitz makes a similar point when he draws attention to the tension
between medical conceptualisations and the person who is the patient: ‘At the
clinical level, we need to recognize and accommodate the essential continuity
between persons who have symptoms that have been given a name and disease-
like status and persons whose suffering remains unnamed and unrecognized’. See
Aronowitz ‘When Do Symptoms Become a Disease?’ p 808.
36 Epstein, Julia, ‘Historiography, Diagnisis and Poetics’, Literature and Medicine
1992; 11(1): pp. 23e44 at 33.
37 Davendralingam N, I Davagnanam, A Djamshidian, A Lees. ‘Progressive
dysphagia, dysarthria, dystonia, and tremor.’ BMJ 2010;340:c1213 doi:http://dx.doi.
org/10.1136/bmj.c1213 accessed 10/07/2016.
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The diagnoses considered e in the process of deciding which p is
the relevant one - include a variant of Parkinson’s disease; pantothe-
nate kinase associated neurodegeneration (a condition in which iron
accumulates and damages the central nervous system); and Wilson’s
disease: a genetic disorder of copper metabolism inwhich the copper
binding protein ceruloplasmin, that transports the elementwithin the
body, is almost completely absent, leading to the toxic element accu-
mulating, and causing tissue damage in the nervous system. Shortly
after its publication the following letter appeared in the journal:
‘Why on earth was a (presumably) previously healthy 25yo
woman allowed to degenerate to the point of being wheelchair-
bound, mute, and droolingwithout apparently having been seen
by a single physician who would not rest until a diagnosis has
been made? Not wishing to cast aspersions, but there is some-
thing very wrong here. Was she a refugee from a country
without even a semblance of adequate health care, or was her
family so passive as to just accept this awful decline? The
diagnosis and treatment of the setting and system shewas living
and being diagnosed in is more of a challenge than the diagnosis
of the patient!’38
Shocked at the turn of events relayed by the case report, the
ostensive concern of the respondent is for more contextual infor-
mation about the patient and her situation which explains the
delay in diagnosing a disease (Wilson’s disease) that usually re-
sponds to treatment with copper chelating agents: treatment
which could have halted and reversed the appalling decline in the
woman’s health. The correspondent, a professor of familymedicine,
demands to know how a human life could have been allowed to fall
apart without someone responding to her plight earlier. The letter
shares a response to the report that references wider realms of
human signiﬁcance - biographical disruption and cultural and
personal meanings e than are easily accommodated by narrow
construals of medical problems for the purposes of diagnosis.39 The
correspondent registers dissatisfaction with the narrow framing of
the report in purely neurological terms, his focus being on the
woman and her social and personal circumstances over and above
the disease and diagnosis.
Archie Cochrane’s account of a man he attended at Elsterhorst, a
German prisoner of war camp in Saxony in 1943, also challenges
case construction from two different perspectives:
‘The Germans dumped a young Soviet prisoner in my ward late
one night. . He had obvious gross bilateral cavitation and a
severe pleural rub. I thought the latter was the cause of the pain
and the screaming. I had no morphia, just aspirin, which had no
effect. I felt desperate. I knew very little Russian then and there
was no one in the ward who did. I ﬁnally instinctively sat down
on the bed and took him in my arms, and the screaming stopped
almost at once. He died peacefully in my arms a few hours later.
It was not the pleurisy that caused the screaming but loneliness.
It was a wonderful education about the care of the dying. I was
ashamed of my misdiagnosis and kept the story secret.’40
The case appeared in a memoir published many years after
these events took place and it has since entered the medical liter-
ature as an example of good palliative care.41 Initially Cochrane
believed it was pain that accounted for the man’s ‘screaming’ for
which he had no treatment, pain due to ‘a severe pleural rub’
caused by tuberculous inﬂammation of the linings of the lung
grating on each other during inspiration. But he retracts the
facticity of this sequence and replaces it with another: that it was
loneliness, a different mental state (not pain) about which the man
had been screaming.42 This claim has the effect of de-medicalizing
the concern away from pathology, medical causation and inade-
quate analgesia towards a focus on the man’s existential situation:
on how prolonged physical closeness could meet an inner need for
accompaniment and still the dying soldier, allowing him to pass
peacefully away. Within the account there is a tension between a
focus on the person who is dying and the attempt to pinpoint the
medical cause of his behaviour, set against the tumultuous back-
ground of the physician’s own emotions, thoughts and attempts to
muster an adequate response to him:
‘I put him in my room as he was moribund and screaming as I did
notwant towake theward. I examinedhim.. I hadnomorphia..
I felt desperate. I knew very little Russian then.. I ﬁnally instinc-
tively sat down on the bed and took him in my arms.. I was
ashamed of my misdiagnosis and kept the story secret.’
Cochrane’s growing sense of desperation dominates the account
and it is through his emotional reactions as physician-narrator that
we learn of the urgency of the situation. Such inner aspects of the
hurly burly of clinicalwork are usually edited out of case reports; and
if they do creep in it is wonder, awe and astonishment that become
apparent in response toclinical appearances43 rather thanshameand
desperation. It is rare to sense the raw desperation, shame and
tenderness seen here; instinctive gestures amounting almost to a
caress lasting hours being conspicuous by their absence in case re-
ports. In the period inwhich these events unfolded, taking a patient
in one’s arms as a physician might have been considered improper;
perhaps publishing the case outside the conﬁnes of a peer reviewed
journal allowedCochrane to bringhis feelings to the fore as part of an
effort to resolvewhat had takenplace betweenhimself and thedying
soldier. Its power and pungency stem from recounting the ‘parade of
present moments’ that make up clinical experience with its ‘reﬂec-
tive pauses’ and ‘takings-stock’44 recalled from a vantage point de-
cades distant from the events themselves. These cases highlight the
role of hindsight in developing perspectives that generate meaning
which goes beyond narrow diagnostic formulations.
38 Glaser, Anthony N, ‘Why so long?’ http://www.bmj.com/rapid-response/2011/
11/02/why-so-long accessed 10/07/2016.
39 As Annemarie Mol puts it, whatever medical problems pertaining to the body
one is faced with ‘they are situated elsewhere: in one’s life.’ Mol, Annemarie, The
Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice. North Carolina: Duke University Press
2002; p 127.
40 Cochrane, Archie, L, (with Max Blythe), One man’s medicine, London: British
Medical Journal (Memoir Club) 1989; p 82.
41 Wiffen, P, ‘The Cochrane collaboration: pain, palliative and supportive care’,
Palliative Medicine 2003; 17: 75e77.
42 Alternatively, it is possible that the soldier was in severe pain all along and that
the pain abated or became much more bearable as a result of this act of recognition,
which allowed him to pass away peacefully.
43 For a fuller treatment of this case see Hurwitz, Brian, ‘What Archie Cochrane
Learnt from a single case’. Lancet 2017; 389: 594-5. On the affects associated with
curious medical cases see Kennedy, Meegan, Revising the Clinic, Ohio: Ohio State
University Press 2010, especially pp 30e53.
44 Freeman, Mark, Hindsight. The Promise and Peril of Looking Backward. Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2010; p 4. A hindsight view favours enactment in and
through the past-tense which Roland Barthes called ‘the cornerstone of Narration’.
Almost invariably this is the ‘Narrative mode’ of medical case reports: ‘The verb
implicitly belongs with a causal chain. [a]llowing as it does an ambiguity between
temporality and causality .. Its function is no longer that of a tense . [but] to
abstract, from the depth and multiplicity of experiences . a logical link .’. See:
Barthes, Roland, Writing Degree Zero, translated by Annette Lavers and Colin Smith,
London: Jonathan Cape, 1967; 30e31.
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4. Narratives of diagnosing
Clinical case reporting generally privileges a medical perspec-
tive, which mufﬂes patients’ voices, calls into question the sub-
jective aspects of illness experiences, and the reliability of patient
testimony. In modern case reports:
‘the patient’s concern is termed a complaint; his or her voice.
[and] information is scant. Use of the passive voice eliminates
agency: for example, ‘the patient was treated with...’ and ‘the
patient was noted on physical examination to have...’. [which]
makes invisible the persons making observations and decisions
and performing procedures. .. [S]peciﬁc linguistic markers
encode scepticism about patients’ accounts, with phrases such
as ‘the patient reports’ or ‘the patient claims’ denoting these
portions of the case as subjective perceptions whichmay or may
not be factual. The perspective dominating the account is that of
the doctor, for the case history is not the patient’s story. It is the
doctor’s highly structured rendering of certain aspects of the
patient’s experience.’45
A modern medical textbook claims that ‘taking a patient’s his-
tory and giving advice in clinical consultation is an exchange of
narratives’,46 yet over the past century-and-a-half, patients’ points
of view expressed in case reports have progressively diminished.
The historian of medicine Jonathan Gillis ﬁnds the patient’s history
to have become ‘a construct and production of the clinical
encounter, rather than a simple expression of the patient’s narra-
tive’, such that there are now two histories in play in case reporting:
‘a superﬁcial, overt, story presented by the patient . and a deep,
covert, and “true” history revealed by.the physician.’47 The latter
makes sensible how the diagnostic process will attempt to identify
the p chosen for the patient and case at hand.
The primary means by which modern cases engage with pa-
tients’ accounts is by excerpting snippets of testimony on their felt
experiences and articulating them with third-party formulations
derived from the differing modalities of clinical assessment - con-
versation, observation, physical examination, and medical investi-
gation. The resulting formulations generate the data from which
the case is assembled through a process of representation which
positions symptoms as the originary point of the report48:
‘A 39-year-old right-handed community nurse presented to us
on the neurology ward in April, 2005, after a telephone call from
her work colleagues. They expressed concern that she had
appeared subdued before starting the afternoon shift and that,
when asked, she could not recall her home address. She had
apparently carried out her morning duties as normal and could
not understand her colleagues’ concerns. However, she agreed
to be reviewed. The nurse’s symptoms had begun 48 h
previously, when she woke with a bitemporal headache, similar
in character to previous episodes of migraine. Her vision then
“ﬂipped 180” so that all images appeared inverted. Shewas able
to crawl back to bed and on waking 6 h later, her vision had
returned to normal and the headache had subsided. There were
no further symptoms, and she continued engagements over the
weekend as planned. She had experienced a similar episode
while at work 12 years previously. Her vision had “ﬂipped”
again, occurring in combination with a migraine.’49
In foregrounding disturbances of mood and memory the entrée
to this case registers differing views on their signiﬁcance, including
the nurse’s own evaluation - that little about her situation seemed
amiss to her e which contrasts with the viewpoints of her col-
leagues who arranged hospital assessment. Hints of such differ-
ences fade as the focus moves to very particular disturbances of the
nurse’s memory and visual perception, situated through glances
forwards to the weekend following their onset, backwards to reg-
ister a similar experience twelve years earlier, then forwards again
to the present, to consider the nurse’s current situation. This
spatiotemporal positioning of the patient’s experiences within a
history frames the account, drawing further information from
medical notes, third-party reports of laboratory and imaging
studies, and physician memory.50
A case which focuses on diagnosis starts life during the clinical
consultation in attempts to identify facts about the patient germane
to the possible causes of illness. Empirical studies show that the
vastmajority of patients attending hospital clinics can be diagnosed
by taking account of the medical history alone, results of clinical
and laboratory examinations proving less frequently contributory
to formulating a diagnosis.51 Frank Davidoff, a former editor of the
Annals of Internal Medicine sees the published case as a post-
consultation representation: ‘a bird’s eye, after-the-fact version of
the diagnostic process.’52 Thus through retrospection, de-
velopments unfolding in the future time of the case inﬂuence the
way the clinical events and happenings which eventuate are pre-
sented in a report. Temporal change and stasis e a simultaneous
grasping of beginning and end along the lines Louis Mink conceived
of for historical narrative e play a role in the encapsulation of
spatiotemporal clinical patterns:
‘. in the conﬁgurational comprehension of a story which one
has followed, the end is connected with the promise of the
beginning as well as the beginning with the promise of the
end. To comprehend temporal succession means to think of it
in both directions at once, and then time is no longer the river
45 Kenny, Nuala P., Brenda L Beagan, ‘The Patient as Text: A Challenge for Problem-
Base Learning.’ Medical Education 2004; 38: 1071e79.
46 Jenicek, Milos, A Primer on Clinical Experience in Medicine. Boca Raton, London,
New York: CRC Press 2014; p 236.
47 Gillis, Jonathan, ‘The History of the Patient History since 1850’, Bull Hist Med
2006; 80(3):490e512 at 512. Kathryn Montgomery makes similar points but nar-
ratologically: ‘[t]he two stories have different authors, different narrative modes,
different themes. The patient’s story . is not simply “raw data.” The patient has
constructed it in an effort to make sense of life-altering events.’ Hunter, Kathryn
Montgomery, Doctors’ Stories: The Narrative Structure of Medical Knowledge
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991; p 62. See also Epstein, Julia, ‘Histori-
ography, Diagnosis, and Poetics’, Literature and Medicine 1992;11: 23e44.
48 Oliver Sacks puts this point clearly: ‘Typically. my case histories start with an
encounter, a letter, a knock on the door e it is the patients’ description of their
experience that stimulates the more general explanation.’ Sacks, Oliver, The Mind’s
Eye. London: Picador 2010; Preface p x.
49 Samarasekera S, Dorman P, ‘The case of the forgotten address’, Lancet 2006; 367:
1290.
50 See Warner, John Harley, ‘The Aesthetic Grounding of Modern Medicine’, Bulletin
of the History of Medicine 2013; 88 1e47. Warner, John Harley, ‘The Uses of Patient
Records by Historians e Patterns, Possibilities and Perplexities’, Health and History
1999; 1: 101e11. Sturdy, Steve. ‘Knowing Cases: Biomedicine in Edinburgh, 1887e
1920’, Social Studies of Science 2007; 37: 659e689.
51 Hampton, John R, MJ Harrison, J R Mitchell, J S Pritchard, C Seymour, ‘Relative
Contributions of History-Taking, Physical Examination, and Laboratory Investigation
to Diagnosis and Management of Medical Outpatients’, BMJ 1975; 2(5969): 486e89;
Peterson MC, J H Holbrook JH, D Von Hales, et al., ‘Contributions of this history,
physical examination, and laboratory investigation in making medical diagnoses’,
West J Med 1992;156:163e5.
52 Davidoff, Frank, ‘Teaching ﬁles, textbook examples e the case of the classic case.’
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research As-
sociation, Atlanta, Ga., April 12e16, 1993 http://acpinternist.acponline.org/archives/
1995/04/textbk.htm?print¼true accessed 04/05/16, reprinted in Davidoff, Frank,
Who has seen a blood sugar? Philadelphia: American College of Physicians 1996; 5e
6.
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which bears us along but the river in aerial view, upstream and
downstream in a single survey.’53
The future is immanent in the way the author selects and dis-
counts, highlights and de-emphasises clinical features of interest:
‘Data about the patient [are] trimmed of irrelevant historical,
physical, and laboratory ﬁndings’54 argues Jerome Kassirer, a
former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, in order to
focus on inter-connectable symptoms and signs that conform to
‘textbook examples (paradigms, prototypical cases)’.55 Experiences
deemed incidental to such patterns may be treated as non-
contributory even though they may have been crucial to the pa-
tient.56 Case reports not only conﬁgure through constructing a
historical narrative, they also present a version of the medical
encounter (a ‘single survey’ in Mink’s terms) that displays a neat
and rational picture of the diagnostic process, excluding or down-
playing information important to the patient and masking disor-
derly features of clinical phenomena.57
It is not just that diagnostic reports beneﬁt fromhindsight: cases
unfold as re-formulations of clinical appearances that commence at
time T1 under a description D1 and are supplanted by subsequent
descriptions D2 at T2, which signiﬁcantly were not available at T1.
One way a case report reaches a decision about which p is relevant,
and explains that choice, is by shifting the description under which
a symptom or clinical phenomenon is ﬁrst encountered - often in
snippets of the patient’s own words - to an account constructed in
quite different terms, emerging through eventuation and from the
results of clinical assessment and investigation. This is shown by
the way the nurse’s visual experiences come to be represented and
understood.
Explanation of her ‘180 reversal of vertical vision meta-
morphopsia’58 is developed through attempts to retrace patho-
logical processes and possible causal mechanisms that can support
a plausible aetiology (see Crasnow, and Currie and Sterelny in this
issue): magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the nurse’s brain
revealed a recent and older lesion in the thalamus, a midline area
known to be associated with visual image orientation. Hypotheses
that could account for recurrent damage to the area are not
explicitly developed in the case report, but almost certainly will
have been considered by the patient’s doctors. Only the most likely
causes, severely diminished or blocked cerebral blood ﬂow, gain
attention because an ultrasound assessment of the nurse’s vascu-
lature revealed a hitherto undiagnosed congenital connection be-
tween the left and right cardiac atria known to cause turbulent
blood ﬂow and to predispose to thrombus formation. Although no
trace of a thrombus was seen on the scan, the supposition is that at
some point after a clot formed it broke away from its point of origin
in the heart and embolized - travelled up the arteries of the neck to
her brain e to injure the thalamus as visualized on MRI scan.
Through a combination of observation, hypothesis and reasoning, a
causal account is developed of how the nurse’s cerebral pathology
(D2) eventuated.59
The nurse’s symptoms (D1) might have been explained by
different thalamic pathologies such as infective, traumatic or hae-
morrhagic damage. But traces of such insults - a history of fever in
relation to cerebral abscess, signs of trauma on X-ray or of altered
blood clotting revealed by in vitro testing e do not feature in this
particular account, which is teleologically organised around
thalamic stroke, not around other possible pathologies. “The Case of
the Forgotten Address” is an end-based account of how evidence to
support a particular diagnosis was put together rather than of how
a ﬁnal diagnosis was discriminated from other likely causes.
Because a certain circulatory hypothesis explained the ﬁndings in
the nurse’s case - an inference grounded in part on considerations
of relative likelihoods not discussed in the report - the authors infer
the truth of that hypothesis.
Links in this chain of causation carry differing epistemic status.
Because there is no direct evidence of intra-cardiac clot formation
and its subsequent movement to the brain, the causal mechanism
remains an inferred one based on likelihood. The report exhibits no
scrutiny of the similarity between the two clinical episodes expe-
rienced by the nurse; their time course is not compared feature by
feature in terms of associated symptoms such as nausea, unstead-
iness and disorientation. The similarity between the episodes re-
mains impressionistic: nomention is made in the earlier one of loss
of memory (a deﬁning characteristic of the ‘case’ according to the
report’s title), altered cognitive ability or of the nurse’s apparent
affective indifference, which are marked features of the recent
episode (‘she could not understand her colleagues’ concerns’).60
The match rests on the nurse’s experience, memory, and on her
capacity to make a judgement of similitude across a long time in-
terval, which the report does not corroborate, for example, in her
answers to further questions. The authors accept an identity rela-
tion between the two episodes holds; and that each belongs to the
same type of syndrome, which suggests that any explanatory hy-
pothesis e the choice of ‘which p?’ - will need to account for two
separate events of the same kind.
The diagnosis is also grounded in matching the nurse’s medical
situation to those described in other case reports of strokes of this
sort61 which Forrester (after Kuhn) identiﬁed as ‘reasoning and
working in shared examples’.62 Such cases have highlighted similar
visual and cognitive disturbances manifest as behaviour described
as ‘robot-like’, evidenced in the nurse continuing to work despite
the onset of alarming visual symptoms. Her headache, anterograde
amnesia and a low score on formal cognitive testing (all of which
are detailed later in the report) are taken to be features sufﬁciently
53 Mink, Louis 0, ‘History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension.’ New Literary
History 1970;1(3):541e558 p 555.
54 Kassirer, Jerome, ‘Clinical Problem Solving e A New Feature in the Journal.’ NEJM
1992; 326(1):60e61.
55 Davidoff ‘Teaching ﬁles’ p1.
56 Wade, Derek T., Peter W Halligan, ‘Do biomedical models of illness make for
good healthcare systems?’ BMJ 2004; 329: 1398e1401.
57 Part of what goes into making case reports appear so ‘neat’ and ‘rational’ is the
privileged knowledge hindsight has of what transpires in a case, all of which may
not be known by the attending clinicians grappling with formulation of a diagnosis,
the sort of historical knowledge to which Arthur Danto refers when he writes that:
‘The whole truth concerning an event can only be known after the event itself has
taken place.’ Danto, Arthur C, Narration and Knowledge, Columbia: Columbia Uni-
versity Press 1985 (revised edition of Analytical Philosophy of History 1968), p151.
See also White, Hayden, ‘Historiography and Historiophoty’, The American Historical
Review, 1988; 93(5): 1193e1199.
58 The medical term metamorphopsia refers to visual images which are distorted
in shape, size or position.
59 Samarasekera, ‘The case of the forgotten address’ 1290.
60 Third person testimony was available from the second episode but the nurse’s
ﬁrst episode may have been unwitnessed; and if it caused alterations in memory it
may not have been possible to gain further corroboration about the relationship
between the two episodes.
61 The authors cite an early description of visual inversion from 1868 in which
there was no clear neurological localisation and two papers on thalamic strokes:
Carrera, L E, Michel P, Bogousslavasky, J, ‘Anteromedian, central and posterolateral
infarcts of the thalamus’, Stroke 2004; 35: 2826e31, and Schmahmann, J, ‘Vascular
syndromes of the thalamus’, Stroke 2003; 34: 2264e78. On visual inversion syn-
dromes and their associated phenomena see: Aysun, Unal, Cila, Aysenur, Saygi
Serap, ‘Reversal of vision metamorphopsia: A manifestation of focal seizure due to
cortical dysplasia.’ Archives of Neurology 1998;55(10):1362e8; and Solms, Mark,
Karen Kaplan-Solms, Michael Saling, Percy Miller, ‘Inverted Vision After Frontal
Lobe Disease’, Cortex 1988; 24(4):499e509.
62 Forrester, ‘On Kuhn’s Case’ 2007 at p 813.
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similar to those set out in earlier cases as to corroborate the diag-
nosis. Thalamic stroke caused by a heart defect underpins the
rationale of treatment: to make the nurse’s blood less coaguable
and dissolve the current clot (if any of it remains), preventing
further intra-cardiac clot formation. At the time the case was
published - nine months after the nurse’s admission to hospital -
her clinical state had vastly improved: she had gone back to work
and had not experienced any recurrence of the symptoms.63
The report is a highly edited account of clinical practices which
translate the nurse’s symptoms e including those of the earlier
period - into a series of pathological processes. Grounded in com-
parisons with clinical patterns in previous case reports, technolo-
gies of looking such as ultrasound and magnetic resonance
scanning, and in what is known of the circulatory physiology and
pathology of a common cardiac anomaly, the report also draws on
what is understood of symptoms associated with damage to the
thalamus.64 The case is assembled from a mass of evidence arising
from the patient herself; her colleagues’ testimony, and from ex-
amination and investigation of her body. A succession of biological
processes is posited which supports an account of how the syn-
drome could have arisen twice, the cardiac lesion being the
‘smoking gun’, the evidential sign of a common cause65 that in
narrative terms enables structurally and functionally distinct
events to be tied together in one story. The nurse’s voice - the
initiatory stimulus of the case e is clearly heard at the start of the
account, but fades as the authors’ technical re-description in
anatomical and physiological terms gets under way and as the
narrative moves towards a diagnosis.
No such process of re-description takes place in the case of
injury to the workman’s boot because no explanation of the man’s
symptoms appears in the account. Without a somatic injury the
diagnosis cannot be likened to apprehending how the incidents of a
story belong together in Mink’s sense,66 because the end of the plot
is not connected with the promise of the beginning, since no
physical process links the uninjured foot to severe pain. If, as Arthur
Danto argues, stories require a beginning, middle and an end, and
the ‘explanation then consists in ﬁlling in the middle between end-
points of a change’67 the point of interest in this case lies precisely
in its narrative gap, the missing explanatory middle.
Despite this ellipsis the case of the uninjured foot remains an
end-organised narrative, one arranged around irresolution rather
than resolution, which works by replacing one puzzle with another.
Yet its signiﬁcance goes beyond the staging of a clinical riddle solely
for amusement; its publication is justiﬁed by an untheorized but
important observation that answers the generic question to which
all non-fraudulent clinical cases respond afﬁrmatively: ‘Is it
possible for such-and-such to occur?’68 The answer calls attention
to the knowledge-bearing nature of this case and alerts readers to
the entanglement of physical and psychological processes in ex-
periences of pain.
Although the clinical history is posited to be the ‘basic experi-
ential unit’69 of medical thinking, the discourse of the case report
does not offer unproblematic access to medical phenomena. The
accounts of the uninjured foot and the dying soldier synchronously
align knowledge with surprise, which subverts the view that the
medical problem can be taken for granted at the level of descrip-
tion. They show that p is subject to radical reformulation at the level
of observation; and it is apparent from the cases that knowledge of
a diagnosis does not predict all the important details of the
experience of illness or the trajectory of a condition in an
individual.70
5. Conclusion: the narrative format
Why do case reports published in today’s general medical
journals articulate clinical understanding through cadences of
arousal and resolution embodied in narratives? The diagnostic
criteria of diseases do not subsist in narrative form; even conditions
featuring a pronounced spatiotemporal dimension such as multiple
sclerosis e which requires evidence of pathological processes at
different moments in time in different parts of the central nervous
system - are formulated as conditional statements concerning the
presence or absence of attributes or functions, not as narratives71;
and although information in clinical records may feature storied
scenes recounted by patients and carers, the overall shape of these
records is much more like a sequential listing of happenings and
ﬁndings than the elaborate, second order conﬁgurations of narra-
tive considered here.
A sense of audience looms large in the way case reports bring
information from different sources together, releasing it along
linear, jumpy and looping time-lines, foreshadowing and fore-
closing on possible futures (see Beatty this issue). Such stagings
engage readers’ imaginations, playing on their expectations
whilst also challenging their powers of pattern recognition and
reasoning.72 The narrative shape of the case is not conﬁned to
published accounts; ethnographers have commented on how
clinical presentations in hospitals are frequently staged as sus-
penseful dramas, ‘surgeons artfully creating stories about pa-
tients and their conditions . akin to mysteries or cliff-hangers,
sometimes morality tales of success and failure.’73 Although
audience hardly featured in Forrester’s account of “thinking in
cases” it turns out to be a prominent inﬂuence on the manner in
63 To the extent that the outcome of this medical assessment is apparent in the
report up to nine months after the onset of the second episode, the efﬁcacy of
anticoagulation cannot be inferred simply from the lack of a recurrence in the
nurse’s case, especially in the light of the fact that she improved without this
treatment after the earlier episode, which did not recur for some twelve years.
64 Steve Sturdy calls this a process of ‘triangulation’ drawing on Susan Leigh Star’s
Regions of the Mind: Brain Research and the Quest for Scientiﬁc Certainty Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1989; 96e117. See also: Sturdy, Steve. ‘Knowing Cases:
Biomedicine in Edinburgh, 1887e1920.’ Social Studies of Science 2007; 37: 659e689.
65 Cleland, Carol E, ‘Methodological and Epistemic Differences between Historical
Science and Experimental Science.’ Philosophy of Science 2002; 69 (3): pp. 447e451
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/342455.
66 Mink, Louis 0, ‘History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension.’ New Literary
History, 1970; 1(3): 541e558 at p 555.
67 Danto Narration and Knowledge 1985; p 233.
68 Millar, Janice M, Harry M Whitaker,‘The Right Hemisphere’s Contribution to
Language: A Review of the Evidence for Brain Damaged Subjects.’ In Sydney J
Segalowitz (ed) Language, Functions and Brain Organization. London: Academic
Press 1983, pp 87e111 at p102 (emphasis in original text).
69 Jacyna, Stephen, Lost Words: Narratives of Language and the Brain, 1825e1926
Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2000; p24.
70 See Ankeny, Rachel A, ‘The Overlooked Role of Cases in Causal Attribution in
Medicine,’ Philosophy of Science 2014; 81(5): 999e1011.
71 Polman, Chris H, Stephen C Reingold, Brenda Banwell, Michel Clanet, Jeffrey A
Cohen, Massimo Filippi et al., ‘Diagnostic criteria for multiple sclerosis: 2010 Re-
visions to the McDonald criteria’, Ann Neurol. 2011; 69(2): 292e302.
72 Kathryn Montgomery Hunter, Doctors’ Stories: The Narrative Structure of Medical
Knowledge Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991; Hurwitz, Brian, ‘Narrative
and the practice of medicine’, Lancet 2000; 356: 2086e2089.
73 Atkinson, Paul, Medical Talk and Medical Work: The Liturgy of the Clinic, London:
Sage, 1995; p. 4. See also Atkinson, Paul, ‘Narrative Turn or Blind Alley?’ Qualitative
Health Research 1997; 7 (3) pp 325e44. For the role of narrative in teaching case
based thinking see Good, Byron J, Mary-Jo Delvecchio Good, ‘“Fiction” and “Histo-
ricity” in Doctors’ Stories’, in Cheryl Mattingly and Linda C. Garro (eds.), Narrative
and the Cultural Construction of Illness and Healing, Berkley: University of California
Press 2000; pp 50e69; Good, Byron J, Medicine, rationality and experience: An
anthropological perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
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which information is orgnanised and disclosed,74 reasoned with,
and made memorable in contemporary clinical case reports.75
The selection of clinical communiqués considered here has
encompassed a range of reporting practices, displaying forms that
indicate the potential of the case report genre to make sense of
widely differing clinical situations. The task is met by creating a
history, ‘a narrative that brings together diverse past facts into a
causal account’76 concerning how a particular p came about, one
which grants authorial viewpoint latitude in the way its features
are presented and encapsulated.77 Encapsulations inﬂect episte-
mological gradients of uncertainty that wax at the start of an ac-
count and wane as data are generated which stimulate hypotheses
and various sorts of inferences. Although case-based diagnostic
reasoning moves from recounted experiences, bodily effects and
traces, to antecedent causes andmechanisms, reports are bound up
with hindsight, with perspective-taking from the future and the
retroﬁtting of information, which suggests that the process of
diagnosis, and so the choice of which p is relevant, appears rational
and unifying.78
The brevity of reports considered here leads them to feature a
high ratio of essential to incidental details, while the balance be-
tween forward clinical reasoning in the context of uncertainty, and
retrospective understanding in the context of hindsight, has a
critical bearing on how a clinical case is seen to unfold.79 By
deploying devices that shape and channel attention80 plots are
generated that rely on readers assuming a future is in place
waiting to be revealed. But how precisely this future will play out,
and how it will be manifested, is a decision for the authors. Re-
ports draw on all the modalities of clinical assessment - conver-
sation, observation, physical examination and investigation e in
which the boundaries between the particulars of illness and
generic conceptions of disease, and between the person who is ill
and the depersoniﬁed patient, may shift and become indistinct.81
Amidst hypotheses and mechanisms invoked to explain what
eventuates, the literary and narrative machineries of the case
interweave their medical subject matters, through which the for-
tunes of individuals come into view. Thus case reporting is
pervious to narrative discourses such as the sentimental tale,82
eccentric biography,83 and suspense and detective ﬁction that
are capable of telling how the trajectories of a life, and of an
illness, intersect diagnostically.
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